Business Valuation Education Video Series

Hello Readers,

In have started a Business Valuation Education Video Series in which, I will explain Valuation concepts by valuing an Indian Healthcare Provider – Kovai Medical Center Hospital – as an example. I will value companies in other sectors (e.g., insurance, banks, asset management companies, industrial, fmcg, retail etc.) after finishing healthcare.

This video series is meant for students / working professionals intending to build a career in / pivot to Finance particularly Valuation or Equity Research.

Link to the Business Valuation Education Video Series: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLqRd1Fd1U5KNK2IVjH6uOu_kC6YuR1Csb

Learning Objectives of this series:

If you are really serious about learning Valuation or Equity Research, please pick this company – Kovai Medical Center Hospital – and value this company along with me – this is the best way to learn! I’d be happy to share all the spreadsheets (without the projections). Start from the first video of this playlist.

I can be reached at gautamrastogi.investandrise@gmail.com or you can PM me on LinkedIn for any questions or any help that you may need.

If you find my content valuable, then please subscribe to my YT channel and follow / connect with me on LinkedIn

Invest and Rise!

Thanks,

Gautam

My notes on Rajshree Polypack, a company that makes packaging for F&B industry

As I have understood, there are two packaging types – rigid and flexible. In rigid packaging, there are broadly two methods to make packaging – Thermoforming and Injection Molding. In thermoforming, plastic rigid sheets are subjected to heat for molding into a desired shape. IM on the other hand, converts plastic pellets into molten material, which is then injected into a mold. Thermoformed packaging is thinner than injection molded and as such both methods have different applications.

Rajshree Polypack (RPPL) is a microcap company that was started as a partnership firm in 2003 and then incorporated as a pvt ltd in 2011. The company makes plastic rigid sheets and thermoformed packaging for food and beverage industry. Plastic rigid sheets are both sold directly to end-customers and are used in captive production of packaging goods. The company has been steadily increasing capacity of both extrusion (for making rigid sheets) and thermoforming.

In FY23, they got into making IM packaging through a toll manufacturing agreement (i.e., Rajshree supplies the raw materials and pays a fee to access the contractorโ€™s manufacturing capabilities). As of now, the mfg capacity is 1,000 MT.

They have entered into a JV – Olive Pack – to make coated paper cups, glasses etc. The capacity will be 12,000 MT. This will get operational in FY25.

Moat

RPPL has a good list of marque F&B customers that have a stringent quality, timely delivery and turn-around-time criteria for packaging. It is not easy to become an approved supplier to such customers. In a very competitive and fragmented industry, this is perhaps RPPL’s biggest and only moat.

What is stopping me from developing 100% conviction just yet?

RPPL is trading at a market cap of INR 230 Cr (as of 20/12/24). 10 years ago in FY14, Mold-Tek Packaging – which makes Injection Molded packaging for paint, lube and F&B companies – had very similar sales (250 cr) and margin (12-13% EBITDA) as RPPL has today. But, Mold-Tek sweated their assets better and made Rs 3 for every Rs. of assets, whereas RPPL, which has a asset turnover of 2 currently. However, Mold-Tek had a higher D/E of 1.3-1.4 vs RPPL 0.7 currently.

During FY14, Mold-Tek saw its market cap become 5-6x from 50 cr to 250-300 Cr, which is at a shouting distance from what RPPL is trading at today. Mold-Tek then went onto post great results year after year. Although, initially they used a lot of debt to drive growth, but very quickly they pared it down to comfortable levels and used internal accruals to increases sales 3x (from FY14; 4x from FY13) to 730 Cr, expanded cumulative EBITDA margin to 17.5% with a weighted avg asset turnover of 2.3. The company now has a market cap of ~3,000 Cr i.e., 10x after its peak valuation of 300 cr in FY14.

The question is can RPPL replicate Mold-Tek’s growth? I do understand that comparison with Mold-Tek may be unfair since it draws 70% of its sales from paint, lube and oil customers; I am attempting to dig out what worked for Mold-Tek and how is RPPL placed currently.

So, now coming to why I don’t have full conviction just as yet?

  1. RPPL supplies to F&B industry only. Thermoformed packaging is thinner vs IM and hence is used in holding lighter content i.e., packaged food. IM packages, on the other hand, find application in a wide variety of industries – paints, lubricants, oils besides F&B. (Back in FY14, Mold-Tek drew 90%+ sales from paint and lube industry and how the split between paints, lubes: food, fmcg is 70:30. Being able to supply do multiple industries seem to have worked well for Mold-Tek). Moreover, thermoformed packaging cannot cater to heavier food content such as ice creams, shrikhand, spreads, dosa batter etc. Not saying thermoforming is inferior. It certainly is not. It finds its end use in different applications, which has limited RPPL to one industry. Make no mistake, F&B industry has great growth potential, but I would have been more confident about RPPL’s prospects if they didn’t stay confined to just F&B.
  2. No in-house Injection Molding yet. RPPL recently forayed into IM through a toll mfg agreement for food delivery containers. Since RPPL does not own the IM mfg tech, they likely wouldn’t be able to tech innovate (as Mold-Tek has been able to) and sign up existing and new marque customers for IM containers. Mold-Tek designs, maintains and manufactures their own molds (they also use robots for in-mold printing and decorating), which has given them an edge over competitors and has also helped them get exclusivity contracts with certain lube customers. Large customers are very picky when it comes to packaging since it is the face of their brand and hence they may not source from a company that does not own the mfg process. This may change in the future if and when RPPL begins investing in its own IM capability (and this may also help them foray into other industries).
  3. Capital allocation decisions! Value proposition in developing paper packaging? Will it lead to a moated business model? I am not so convinced. Although, this will likely give them good sales uptick serving HoReCa, but then how does it help in building a sustainable competitive advantage? Paper packaging is a non-differentiated / commodity item (but then one might argue that plastic rigid sheets are as well). What stops HoReCa customers from switching to (and keeping) other vendors? I believe the differentiation may not entirely be in the product per se (but because they have a good clientele, they may be to upsell them this new product category). Moreover, this new mfg capability demands an investment of 100 Cr, of which RPPL is putting half. To put it in context, this 50 cr is 1/3rd of RPPL’s gross fixed assets. Allocating an amount equivalent to 1/3rd of your gross fixed assets in a capability with low competitive advantages may not have been the best thing to do in my opinion. I hope I am proved wrong!
  4. Possibility of margin expansion? Over the last 5 years RPPL has witnessed its margin deteriorate (although, they have been able to more-or-less pass on RM price increases with a lag). This has been due to low operating leverage, high depreciation and interest cost. As op leverage plays out, they should see their margin expand. Mold-Tek expanded their cumulative EBITDA margin by 5% over the last 10 years because of widening gross margins, operating leverage and low levels of debt. Moreover, in-house IM mfg and automation has aided Mold-Tek keep in its margin expansion. Now, RPPL has in-house thermoforming, but since they don’t own the IM mfg, this may constrain RPPL’s ability to expand its margins to the extent Mold-Tek has been able to.
  5. Promoter giving aggressive guidance?. There have been instances (although I am leaning towards not reading much into them for now) where the promoter has not entirely walked the talk e.g., promoter was confident on margin expansion in FY23, but that didn’t happen. They were also expecting the olive pack mfg plant to commence from Oct, Nov 2023, but that didn’t happen. Re: barrier packaging sale, promoter gave a guidance of 30 cr+ in FY24, however only 10 cr in H1 has happened. I like conservative promoters better.
  6. Tube lamination business commenced, but was put on halt. The management seemed very ecstatic about this business at one point, but now they are saying it has been paused and will be looked into at a later point.
  7. Statutory audit fees increased from 8 L in FY21 to 16 L in FY22 to 22 L in FY23. Sales and scale of operations also did increase from 16K MT to 26K MT in this period. Scale can be equated to more work for auditors. So this is fine for now. However, if the disproportionate increase in audit fees continues then it will be a red flag.
  8. Strategic foreign investor gradually reducing their holding. Wifag Polytype Holding AG has been decreasing shareholding; 19.8% FY22 to 17.2% FY23 to 16.4% now. Moreover, Mr. Alain Edmond Berset (DIN: 07181896) resigned from the post as the nominee director of the Company (on behalf of Wifag Polytype Holding AG) w.e.f March 10, 2023.
  9. Aging receivables. 8% of the receivables were aged in FY23 i.e., beyond 1 year. This number was 4% in FY21 and 2% in FY22. RPPL has credit terms of 60 days. Since RPPL adds a good number of customers every year. I am assuming not all of these are very known brands. Many of these may be small mom-n-pop F&B businesses. If these small businesses don’t do well, they may shut shop and just not honor their payments to RPPL.
  10. Regulatory overhang. RPPL has stated that its products are of a much higher thickness than the ones which the government has sought to ban. Even if the regulations become aggressive, the end-companies wouldn’t stop selling their products. They will resort to alternatives such as bio-degradable packaging or thicker plastic. RPPL has also repeatedly stated that it has the capability to manufacture bio-degradable / sustainable products and they have the required certifications.

Despite having raised the above, one can’t overlook the fact that RPPL has a great set of F&B clients that can be sold more products in the future (but that will take some doing). Even with supplying the existing set of products to these existing clients, RPPL should continue growing. However, I’d like them cover a broader part of the value chain; they are doing it currently, but perhaps not in the way it has been done (by Mold-Tek).

Closing Thoughts and Valuation

It is interesting to note that as per my DCF (after projecting the three financial statements), for RPPL to almost justify its current valuation of Rs. 230 Cr, the company needs to demonstrate very similar growth, margin expansion and capital efficiency as Mold-Tek did over the last 10 years.

I am tempted to say that the market is pricing in the same high growth as Mold-Tek for RPPL, but that may not be entirely true. Right now, Indian micro and small cap scape seems to be in euphoria. People are playing the momentum game (I don’t know how to time the markets; I have a very long term investing horizon) so the market pricing currently does not seem rational. When the frenzy fades away and normalcy returns, and RPPL is available at sane valuations, then I may take a small stake subject to how some of the above points unfold in the future.

P.S: This is not a recommendation.

For any questions or comments, feel free to email me at gautamrastogi.investandrise@gmail.com or PM me on linkedin.

My notes on Tinna Rubber, a company that recycles tyres

Image credits: tyreandrubberrecycling

When you come across a growth story with powerful powerful (yes used the word twice!) tailwinds, you may be inclined to overpay for growth. But then you hit on too many red flags relating to quality of reported financials — then you pause, you think shall I leave it and go find another company or am I overthinking? This is great industry to be in! Perhaps the red flag is really amber or could even be green if I give this company a chance!

Putting this gyan aside, I’d try to be objective in my short notes about this company. Again, these notes are more like my personal journal that I am making public.

Company Business

Tinna Rubber is witnessing strong circular economy tailwinds. The company sources End-of-Life (EOL) tyres and recycles them to make Crumb Rubber, Crumb Rubber Modifier, Reclaim Rubber and Steel (by-product). They are the largest EOL tyre recyclers in India.

Timeline:

  • 1998: Company claims to have pioneered CRMB (Crumb Rubber Modifier for Bitumen) or rubberized asphalt, which are used to in road construction.
  • 2010: Claims to become largest producer of CRMB. Commissioned bitumen emulsion plant
  • 2014: Commissioned reclaim rubber plant. Reclaim rubber is sold to companies making tyres, conveyer belts and mats.
  • 2017: Started exporting
  • 2020: Set up organized collection and safe disposal of waste tyres in tie-up with Bridgestone
  • 2021: Expanded capacity of micronized rubber (ultra fine crumb rubber) and reclaim rubber. Set up subsidiary in Netherlands.
  • 2023: Set up ops in Oman by buying a rubber crumbing plant.

Infrastructure Segment:

Crumb Rubber and Crumb Rubber Modifier are sold to road builders. Crumb Rubber Modified Bitumen (vs virgin bitumen) is said to increase the life of roads and also reduces GHG emissions. There is a lot of government push to use CRMB for building roads.

Crumb Rubber Modifier is also sold to refineries like IOC. Petrochemical refineries, when they refine crude oil, a byproduct for them is bitumen / asphalt. IOC produces bitumen and blend it with the crumb rubber modifier for selling to road contracting community directly. Other refineries produce their own CRMB. They source the raw material – Crumb Rubber – from companies like Tinna.

Industrial Segment:

Crumb Rubber (specifically fine crumb rubber) and Reclaim Rubber is sold to Tyre and conveyor belt makers.

With Extended Producer Responsibility going into effect, the onus is on tyre makers to be more responsible for recycling their produce and use a portion of recycled rubber (from EOL tyres) instead of all new rubber. This is not only acting a strong tailwind for recycled rubber consumption, but also finally catalyzing the process of setting up an infrastructure for the disposal and collection of EOL tyres in India.

Tinna rubber has struggled with sourcing EOL tyres in the domestic market (despite there being abundance of EOL tyres in India). They currently import 60% of their EOL tyre requirement. This should reduce overtime.

Tyre companies have a long 2-3 year approval process for recycled raw materials (actually, tyre makers have a multi-year approval cycle for everything and not just recycled raw materials). Tinna is doing business with all leading tyre manufacturers in India and has now been approved to supply to two international players as well.

Consumer Segment:

This is the smallest segment for Tinna and is witnessing the highest growth rate both owing to low base and industry tailwinds.

Points of Caution

While there are strong tailwinds for the business segments they operate in – there is government push on circular economy i.e., using recycled material for roads (infra) and EPR regulation for tyre makers, which is going to drive decadal demand for this company, but there are quite a few points of caution I noticed when I delved into their financials. I have listed the key ones below:

  1. Contingent liabilities (these are liabilities for which a company does not need make provisions; they lead to earning erosion if they materialize in the future):
    • corporate guarantee to credit facility taken by related parties – subsidiary Tinna Trade and associate company TP Buildtech – worth 86 Cr in FY23, 48 Cr in FY22
    • disputed tax litigations of Rs 11.5 Cr
  2. Curious accounting: a tax dispute of 5.6 Cr from FY14 was not debited from P&L in FY21 when the matter resolved, but was debited only from equity. A CA could comment if accounting allows such a treatment, but logically speaking if this were allowed then companies would look more profitable than they really are.
  3. Non-core investments of Rs 24 Cr: Good thing is that company recognizes these as non-core and is looking to liquidate them — this red flag changes to green when this happens!
  4. Investments into associate company: Tinna Rubber has invested 7.4 Cr (of which 2 Cr were done in FY23) in an associate company TP Infratech. The promoters say that this associate company is into construction materials and hence has synergies with their core business. Not a whole lot about the business operations of this associate company is known.
  5. Receivables from associate company: The holding company i.e., Tinna Rubber has receivables worth 2 Cr in FY23 (6% of overall) and 5 Cr in FY22 (15% of overall) from the associate company.
  6. Loans to and from related parties: Many such transactions. A key one worth mentioning — promoter Bhupinder Sekhri gave a loan of 1.2 Cr and 1.6 Cr in FY23 and FY22 resp. He recovered these amounts from the company in the same year after charging interest. This is fine. Investors can live with it. However, he took a loan of 2 Cr from the company in FY22. There is a receivable of 1.2 Cr in FY23 i.e., he is yet to pay this amount to the company. Moreover, this seems to be an interest free loan (At the same time, his compensation from increased from 1.2 Cr in FY22 to 2.4 Cr in FY23). Case of promoter treating company as their personal bank offering their desired interest rate?
  7. Related party transactions contd: Many purchase from sale to related parties transactions. Moreover, overall receivables from related parties far exceed payables to related parties — negatively impacting the working capital.
  8. Discrepancy in numbers:
    • I wasn’t able to reconcile the reported sale volume numbers across the quarterly investor presentations in FY22 and FY23. An analyst did ask about this to the management during a concall. I wasn’t able to understand management’s explanation. Nor do I think the analyst did (unless the analyst emailed the management later and got justification for the anomaly).
    • Moreover, the capacity expansion communicated via investor presentation from FY24-Q2 does not exactly match with the plan communicated via concall. Anyways, this is not necessarily a red flag. This is me knit picking!
  9. Volatility in sales and profits up until FY20: Management’s explanation “That was the phase when our multiple customer base between the road sector and non-road sector had not stabilized is achieved now. Therefore, going forward I feel we have better visibility, better ability to adjust to any down cycle in a particular sector. So, we feel more confident now of our revenue projections and our profitability”

Valuation

The company has a market cap of ~INR 1,000 Cr at 39x TTM earnings as of 1/12/2023.

Management expects sales to reach 900 Cr in FY27 (from 300 Cr in FY23) on the back of tyre crushing capacity increasing from 80,000 MT in FY23 to 250,000 MT in FY27.

Taking management’s guidance as inputs to my DCF model – after projecting the 3 financial statements – I find the fair market cap to be ~600 Cr i.e., 23x TTM earnings. At a market cap of 1,000 Cr, I find Tinna Rubber excessively overpriced. Future growth seems to have been priced in given the strong industry tailwinds.

There is subjectivity in valuations. Below are my key assumptions:

  1. Sales Growth: Tinna Rubber grows 3x to 900 Cr in Sales by FY27 (as per management’s commentary). With strong recycling tailwinds, the company adds a whooping 2,000 Cr to Sales by FY38 i.e., Sales grow almost 10x from current over 15 years.
  2. Capacity Expansion: Tyre crushing capacity grows 3x to 250,000 MT by FY27 (as per management’s commentary). Capacity further expands to 600,000 MT by FY38 i.e., Capacity expands almost 8x from current over 15 years.
  3. Debt: Company raises debt of ~30 Cr in FY24 (as per management’s commentary). As per my model, the company will need to raise additional debt of ~50 Cr by FY30 i.e., 80 Cr debt to fund expansion. Internal accruals won’t suffice until then. However, post FY31, the company will generate sufficient cash flows and will be able pare down debt.
  4. Margin: With operating leverage and reduced interest costs, PAT margin increases almost to 10% in FY38 from 7.5% currently
  5. Cost of Equity: 14% as my bare minimum return expectation

Summary

The above assumptions need to be true to justify a price of INR 600 Cr (i.e., 23x earnings) today. I believe my base case assumptions paint quite an optimistic story.

Let’s say that the company walks the talk (and my optimistic assumptions start being true), market exuberance gradually fades away (i.e., sanity returns) and the stock trades at its fair multiple of 23x 3-4 years out.

โ€œIn the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine.โ€ โ€” Ben Graham.

As per FY27 projection, the company will do Sales and PAT of INR 900 Cr and ~80 Cr respectively. Assuming the company trades at 23x 3-4 years out, then the then market cap could increase to ~INR 1,800 Cr (from 1,000 Cr as of 1/12), which is 1.8x growth. While this is not a bad return at all. But, I wonder why should I put my capital in a this risky stock for slightly better returns vs the relatively low risk index.

Although, I like the strong strong tailwinds, but because there is good scope of improvement in earnings quality and corporate governance, and also because of ridiculously high valuations I’d give this company a pass.

I am yet to look into GRP and Elgi Rubber, which are trading at even higher P/E multiples.

PS: This is not a buy/sell recommendation.

I’d be fine enclosing my 3 financial statement linked valuation model of Tinna Rubber for anyone looking to learn valuation and equity research. Interesting things one would learn in this modeling exercise (besides the usual):

  1. when (and how much) debt is needed to fund growth? i.e., when does the model indicate that internal accruals are not enough to fund growth?
  2. how to project terminal cash flows when the company in question has generated uneven free cash flows owing to regular capital expansions?

Feel free to email me at gautamrastogi.investandrise@gmail.com or PM me on linkedin.

Oriental Carbon and Chemicals – Indian company operating in an Oligopoly

Image credits: tirehub.com

OCCL makes Insoluble Sulphur, which is used as a vulcanizer in the manufacturing of tires. There are 4 companies – Eastman / Flexsys (US), Shikoku (Japan), Chinese Sunsine and OCCL – that make a major chunk of the IS in the world. High capital intensity and long IS approval cycles by tire manufacturers has posed high barriers to entry making this industry an oligopoly.

Market: As of FY23, the global market size of IS is under 3,00,000 MT (or 300 million kgs). A bulk of the demand is driven by replacement (~70%) and the rest through new tires. The table below shows the global demand distribution.

India (non mentioned explicitly in the above table) has a market size of 20,000 MT i.e., ~7% of global. Only 50% of Chinese demand is quality IS. Since OCCL is into making various grades of quality IS, hence, the addressable market as of FY23 is closer to 2,50,000 MT.

The table below lists the global tire production and avg IS requirement per tire. You would see that the avg IS requirement per tire is 120 grams. Take these numbers with a pinch of salt, since I wasn’t able to reconcile tire production numbers from other sources, but they are in a distant ballpark.

Source: expertmarketresearch.com, IMARC group, OCCL Annual Report

Indian market is expected grow in double digits over the next 10 years driven by increasing radialization of tires and shift towards EV. EVs require lighter tires, which in turn demand more IS. Global market is expected to grow at 3% CAGR over the decade.

Market Share: Eastman has 60-70% global market share and is a price setter and other companies are price takers. OCCL has 55-60% market share in India, and a market share of under 10% globally. Tire makers like to work with more than one supplier and hence OCCL is either a preferred or secondary supplier to leading players like MRF, Brigdestone, CEAT, JK Tire etc. OCCL has sub 5% market share in the US. Over the past few earning calls, OCCL management has said that they are targeting to get to 10-12% market share in the US and it is a key focus area for them. They couldnโ€™t penetrate the Chinese market and are not focusing on that market anymore.

Business: Over the last 3 years, the industry has witnessed high raw material (sulfur) costs. Although, like other players OCCL is able to pass the increase in raw material costs to its customers with a lag, resulting in OCCL able to largely sustain the absolute gross profit per kg of sold IS, but this does not help sustain gross and operating margins. Due to high sulphur prices, the IS ASP / kg for OCCL increased from Rs 125 in FY22 to Rs 150-160 in FY23 per my estimates, but the gross and operating margin remained depressed at 60% and 15% respectively. On a good year, their gross and operating margins are 70% and 25%.

OCCL has a total IS capacity of 39,500 MT. Every 3-4 years, they do an IS capacity expansion of 11,000 MT in two phases if they have reached 85-90% of capacity utilization and if they see a healthy demand environment (They also manufacture Sulfuric Acid and use the steam produced in the process to make IS. Sulfuric Acid makes under 10% of their sales). Making IS is capital intensive and while ramping up capacity, it takes a while to reach optimal utilization.

Moat: the oligopolistic nature of the industry, high entry barriers, and tire radialization and EV tailwinds, coupled with regular expansions and low cost manufacturing (vis-ร -vis US and Japanese makers) are moats for OCCL.

Few things to note before considering an investment:

  1. High Freight Expenses: Other expenses were 102 cr and 135 cr in FY21 and FY22 respectively. Freight was 25% and 31% of other expenses in these years. Due to supply chain congestion around the world and since all the markets have presence of IS suppliers on their shores, OCCL incurred high expenses shipping to export markets. This dilutes OCCL’s moat of being a low cost player.
  2. High expansion spending? May be not!: Phase 1 of a brown field expansion costs OCCL Rs. 200-220 per kg, whereas China Sunshine incurs 50% less than OCCL to build phase 1 IS capacity. Reasons could be a.) OCCL is spending more than they should Or b.) As per my estimates, OCCL sold IS at Rs 125 per kg in FY21 and FY22, but China Sunshine sold IS at Rs 90 in the same time periods. This suggests that China Sunshine perhaps makes an inferior quality and hence it costs them less to set capacity for IS.
  3. Threat from Chinese competitors: While there is always a lingering threat from China, but as per ICRA credit report from Augโ€™22, Chinese companies lack the required Environmental, Health and Safety standards and because of their inconsistent quality, global tire manufactures are wary of sourcing from them.
  4. Sale of Eastmanโ€™s tire additive business to PE: This transaction happened in 2021. It remains to be seen what the new management does. If they expand aggressively then it will adversely impact IS prices.
  5. De merger into two listed entities: Oflate, OCCL has done a lot of AIF investments, which has not gone well with the shareholders. They are now splitting into two companies – one will be the chemical business and the other will be focused on such investments. Existing shareholders will get shares of both the companies.
  6. OCCL Promoters – Compensation: The promoters Arvind Goenka and his son Akshat Goenka have demonstrated good execution, resulting in increasing capacity from 3,400 MT in 1994 to 39,500 MT today and achieving a dominant market position. Overall compensation of the two promoters combined has been historically at 6.5% of PAT. Since, the PAT declined (from 83 cr in FY21 to 46 cr in FY22) by 44% in FY22, the commission portion โ€“ tied to profits โ€“ declined as well (from 2.2 cr to 1.7 cr i.e., 23% decline), but the salary component increased (from 3.1 cr to 3.3 cr) to offset the decline in commissions. As a result, due to sharp PAT decline, the sticky overall compensation jumped to 10.9% of PAT in FY22 (still within the statutory limit). For now, I think this is fine and am not making anything of it, but it needs to be tracked.
  7. Unexplained Payments of service charges, rent to related parties and miscellaneous expenses: There are unexplained services charges of 1.26 cr in FY22 (and 1.07 cr in FY21) to Duncan International (India) and New India Investment Corp, which are promoter entities. There is an additional annual service charge of 1.08 cr, which is embedded in the highlighted line item below. I am not sure what these charges are for. There is a rent payment of 0.83 cr in FY22 to a Cosmopolitan Investments Ltd, another promoter entity. While rent can be understandable, but these service charges make up 1.7% and 2.1% of other expenses (and 0.6% of sales) in FY22 and FY21. There are unexplained miscellaneous expenses of 8.16 cr in FY22 and 6.68 cr in FY21. These make up 6.0% and 6.5% of other expenses (and 1.8% and 2.0% of Sales) in FY22 and FY21, respectively. They could itemize this and provide some detail. Service charges and Miscellaneous expense combined form 8-9% of the Other Expenses and 2.5% of Sales. This is the main gripe I have – unexplained expenses! This is up to investors as to how they want to read this.

Valuation: OCCL is trading 16x earnings and 1.3x book at a market cap of ~780 Cr as of this writing (1/7/2023). My DCF valuation (after projecting the three financial statements) finds OCC to be fairly valued.

Valuations are subjective. I have taken many assumptions to project out cash flows for OCCL. Some of the key ones are as follows:

  1. Discount rate of 14% as my bare min return expectation
  2. Operating Margin of 20% which is their historical average.
  3. Implied 10 year CAGR growth of 6.5% after assuming a market share decline from 55-60% to 50% in India, a global market share of under 10% and only a slight increase in realization per kg of IS over 10 years. Any radialization and EV tailwind is my (unquantified) margin of safety.
  4. 2×11,000 MT capacity expansions in two phases resulting in an overall capacity of 61,500 MT over 10 years. This is consistent with history.

While I need to get clarity on the unexplained expense line items (particularly the service charges to promoter entities), I am leaning towards taking an educated bet given their business moats. But Iโ€™d sit on the fence for a while and will likely pull the trigger when it is available at a discount.

PS: This is not a recommendation.

Vardhman Textiles – playing the commodity game

image credits: moneylife.in

In my quest to find honest, well run and moated undervalued securities, I chanced upon the Cotton Textiles sector. I quickly realized that most of the companies (more specifically companies that spin cotton yarn and make fabrics) in this sector are trading at high single digit / low double digit PE due to commodity nature of the business.

The companies differentiating themselves in this sector see their valuation multiples expand. Companies that have commanded a premium overtime are those that have vertically integrated e.g., KPR Mills (not analyzed as of this writing), which makes apparel (including branded apparel starting 2019) from most of their own yarn and fabric.

In this sector, I looked at Ambika Cotton (disc: I have taken a small position in Ambika) and Vardhman Textiles. This writing is on Vardhman. Usually, I love getting to the point of valuing companies after I have analyzed their business and evaluated their management, but in this case I couldn’t move over to valuation. Reasons are presented below.

Business

Textile Value Chain: Spinning -> Fabric making -> Apparel making -> Apparel branding

VTL is into the spinning commodity cotton yarn (63% of FY22 sales) and fabric making (31% of FY22 sales; more or less at this level since the last 5 years) business.

In FY22, most of the spinners across the world did well and in FY23, the spinners saw their sales and margin drop due to falling demand and very high cotton prices.

Spinners like VTL are very sensitive to raw material prices and are easily replaceable (although, with increase in cotton prices the yarn prices also increase worldwide, but when Indian cotton prices are higher (than world cotton), then it puts Indian spinners in a disadvantage since Indian spinners alone will not be in a position to increase the yarn prices commensurately in the world market — this results into the business shifting outside India to countries like Vietnam). The sensitivity to raw material reduces as you move up the value chain. Spinners diversify either by producing specialty yarn, which is less sensitive to raw material (e.g., Ambika Cotton) and/or moving up the value chain (e.g., KPR Mills)

Note – American, Brazilian and Australian cotton sells typically at a $0.15 premium to NY futures and Indian cotton has a lower premium of $0.5. Although, length, touch, feel of Indian cotton is comparable (or even better) than others, but Indian cotton is contaminated because it is manually pit. Owing to this contamination, Indian cotton typically sells at a discount. However, in FY23 (and now in FY24), the Indian cotton prices are trading at par with American and that of other countries. In turn, Vietnamese yarn sells at a premium since they use American cotton. Since Indian cotton prices are high in FY23 (and now in FY24), Indian spinners are not making margins.

a. Continued focus on the commodity game

VTL has ~12 lakh spindles, which is 2% of India’s spindle Capacity (6 cr spindles). Each spindle produces ~200 kg of yarn annually. VTL plans to add 10% (i.e., 2.5 lakh spindles) of the industry’s incremental capacity addition (25 lakh spindles) over the next 3 years. While this appears as playing a commodity game, which is true, the good thing is that they use 25% of their own yarn for fabric making.

Per FY23-Q2 con call, VTL does not seem to have any plans to expand on cotton fabric (and garmenting), where in they use their own produced cotton yarn (and fabric). This is despite expressing cotton spindle expansion plans. Hence, it seems they will continue to play the commodity game without doubling down on the cotton fabrics. They do intend to expand into the synthetic fabric side, but synthetic fabric raw material is petroleum based, which means they will have to depend upon other (synthetic) yarn producers for synthetic/blended fabrics. They make only 1% of sales from garmenting, which is an area they have not expanded yet.

b. Not so much focus on captive energy i.e., operational efficiencies from existing business

VTL’s energy expense as % of sales is 8-9%, which is 2x that of Ambika Cotton, a company that produces all the power it consumes. VTL plans to add 10% (of 2.5 lakh spindles) of the industry’s incremental capacity addition (25 lakh spindles) over the next 3 years, and has not communicated on running more efficiently via captive energy consumption.

Management

a. High Incentives

  1. Promoter commission higher than the set limit: CMD, Mr S P Oswal received 42.44 cr in commissions in 2022. This is 2.74% of the Net Profit. However, per resolution dated 27th September, 2018, he can receive a commission “equal to 2% of net profit calculated as per Section 198 of the Companies Act, 2013 subject to total remuneration being within the limits as prescribed in Part-II of Schedule-V to the Companies Act, 2013“.
  2. Sticky performance incentives despite falling PAT: Per the annual report, for the JMDs Mrs. Suchita Jain (daughter of promoter Mr. SP Oswal) and Mr. Neeraj Jain (not related to the promoters), their “Performance Linked Incentives are decided by the Nomination & Remuneration Committee based on the profits calculated at the end of Financial Year. When PAT increased from 592 cr to 741 cr in 2019, their combined incentive increased from 1.28 cr to 1.62 cr. When PAT fell to 591 cr in 2020, their combined incentive fell very marginally to 1.59 cr and stayed at that level when PAT declined further to 427 cr in 2021.
  3. Associate company promoter commission exceeds the set limit: Mr. Sachit Jain, who was with VTL until 2018, is the JMD of Vardhman Special Steels (VSSL), which is an associate company of VTL. He is also VTL promoter Mrs. Suchita Jain’s husband. Mr. Sachit Jain’s commission is based on the VSSL’s Return on Average Net Worth: “1.5% of the Net Profit of the Company if RoANW for that year is up to 15%. 3% of the Net Profit of the Company if RoANW for that year exceeds 15%”. However, I see that Mr. Sachit Jain was paid 6.4% of Net Profit as commission i.e., Rs. 5.56 cr. in excess commission over 2021 and 2022. Moreover, when incentives amplify on crossing a threshold, it motivates clever accounting.

b. Related Party Transactions

Subsidiary Vardhman Acrylics paid a dividend of 200 cr on a net profit of 15 cr, resulting in reducing its book equity from 318 cr to 132 cr. VTL owns 70% of this subsidiary and hence, received 140 cr of this dividend. In fact, over the last 10 years Vardhman Acrylics has paid a dividend of 305 cr on a FCF of 228 cr. The 140 cr constituted 73% of the 193 cr dividends of the holding company VTL in 2022. In prior years, this subsidiary has constituted 20-25% of VTL’s dividends, but in 2022, VTL made up for its low payout by drawing 140 cr from VA at the expense of VA’s book equity. Hence, shareholders of Vardhman Acrylics compensated those of its holding company VTL.

c. Unexplained Miscellaneous Expenses

There is no explanation given regarding the “other miscellaneous expenses”. These are not small numbers. For context, these are 40% and 20% of the 2021 and 2022 capex respectively.

Summary

I am out for now because VTL is a commodity business with low moat / competitive advantages. I will consider though when they move up the value chain from spinning commodity cotton yarn to not just fabric making but garmenting. This will make them less sensitive to cotton prices. Moreover, unexplained miscellaneous expenses, high promoter incentives, related party transactions does not tick my investment checklist either.

Hope this was informative. Please feel free to write to me if you have any questions

Disc: I have a small position in Ambika Cotton. I have no position in Vardhman Textiles and KPR Mills as of this writing.

Costco Equity Valuation

Costco Wholesale Corporation (Costco) has a solid business model with a predictable stream of subscription revenue, which constitutes 90% of the net profit.

In the video (embedded below), I have projected out Costco’s financial statements and valued its equity. Although, Costco trades at a P/E of ~36 (amongst the highest in the retail business it operates in), I have found it to be fairly valued.

I have embedded the base excel (without the projections). Please feel free to download and try to model the financial statements and value Costco’s equity if you’d like. Do write to me if you have any questions.

Value in Facebook

Facebook earns close to 99% of its revenue by advertising. Marketers pay for ad products based on the number of impressions delivered or the number of clicks done by users. The business continues to impress me given that my friends, family and colleagues are so hooked to the platform and most of them (albeit to varying degrees) can’t wait to give the lurking marketers access to their personal information at the expense of getting connected and endorsed (for posting their views/sharing pics etc etc you know it) with their network. I will cast aside my prejudice and value Facebook in this post.

First some facts

As of Sept’19, the platform reported to have 2.4 billion monthly active users world wide, which is 32% of the world population. FB earned an average of $28 per user over the the last 12 months (as of Sept’19). This translates to 4x growth in per user revenue since 2013 and ~3x since 2014. The platform draws $130 per user from US and Canada, followed by $41 per user from Europe (which includes Russia and Turkey), $12 from Asia and $8 from Rest of the world (which includes Africa, Latin America and Middle East). Although, US and Canada have the highest per user revenue, they account for only 10% of the user base.

The user base as a percentage of world population has increased from 17% in 2013, 19% in 2014 to 32% in 2019

Moreover, FB makes $11.6 as pre-tax operating profit on a revenue of $28 per user. This translates to a pre-tax operating margin of ~42% after capitalizing R&D expenses.

Valuation

Before jumping into valuation, let’s do a quick refresher on how a company is valued. Value of a firm is the present value of its projected Free Cash Flows (FCF). FCF is the the portion of net operating profit after tax that is left after meeting the firm’s reinvestment needs. So to value a firm, one needs to project operating profit (i.e. revenue x margin%) and reinvestments 5-10 years out (and discount them to present using the firm’s cost of capital).

Facebook story is that of an active user growth play. I go on to value FB under 3 scenarios using different revenue projections based on combinations of user base (as a %age of world population) and average revenue per user (ARPU). In all the 3 scenarios, I take the same margin, reinvestment cost of capital and return assumptions as follows –

  • Margin: I assume that the current margin will drop from 42.05% to 40% over the next 10 years. Your estimate of future margins may be higher or lower, but I believe the status quo will more or less continue which is reflected in the 2% margin drop that I have assumed.
  • Reinvestment: Again, I believe the existing state of operations will continue leading to the firm operating at current capital efficiency of 1.31 (i.e. FB generate $1.31 in revenue for every dollar invested) 10 years out. Capital efficiency ratio is used estimate reinvestments (Reinvestment = Change in Revenue / Cap Eff).
  • Cost of Capital: I have used 8.3% as the cost of capital which gradually reduces to 8% over the 10 year period.
  • Return on Invested Capital: Given the unwavering user engagement the platform has demonstrated, I believe that marketers will not pull out anytime soon and the platform will continue to increase the size of the digital marketing universe. The firm will continue to have competitive advantage and create value beyond year 10. With this belief, I assume an ROIC greater than the cost of capital beyond year 10.

1. Sane Scenario – I project user growth with the belief that FB’s active user base reaches 35% of the world population over the next 5 years from 32% today. This leads to the addition of 400 million new active users over the next 5 years which is under 40% of the new users addition over the last 5 years. Moreover, I make ARPU growth rate projections with the belief that ARPU will increase by ~1.75x in the next 5 years. (Overall ARPU has increased ~3x from $10 to $28 over the last 5 years). A combination of this ARPU and MAU growth (ARPU x Active Users = Revenue) leads to an implied revenue CAGR of 16% over the next 5 years, which is 40% of the growth over the last 5 years.

Using the above revenue growth (also operating margin, same capital efficiency and cost of capital) assumptions, the value of equity in common stock I estimate is $657 billion which is over 10% of its market cap as on 12/31/19. The intrinsic share value that I get is ~$225 as against its current trading price of ~$205
Model credits – Dean of Valuation Prof. Aswath Damodaran

2. Upbeat Scenario – Letting my prejudice towards the platform flow in, I project user growth with the belief that FB’s active user base reaches 40% of the world population over the next 5 years from 32% today. This leads to the addition of 790 million new active users over the next 5 years which is under 75% of the new users addition over the last 5 years. Moreover, I make ARPU growth rate projections with the belief that ARPU will increase by ~2x in the next 5 years. (Overall ARPU has increased ~3x from $10 to $28 over the last 5 years). A combination of this ARPU and MAU growth leads to an implied revenue CAGR of 20% over the next 5 years, which is half of the growth over the last 5 years.

Using the above revenue growth projections, the value of equity in common stock I estimate is ~$722 billion which is over 20% of its market cap as on 12/31/19. The intrinsic share value that I get is ~$247 as against its current trading price of ~$205

3. Downbeat Scenario – In the event that FB’s active user base increases at the same rate as the world population i.e. active user base remains at 32% over the next 5 years and ARPU grows ~1.6x, this yields a revenue CAGR of 12 % over the next 5 years.

The value of equity in common stock I get using revenue CAGR of 12% is ~$542 million, which translates to an intrinsic share value of ~$186 making the share overvalued by 9%

Conclusion

Not letting my prejudice overpower, my story of Facebook is centered on the “Sane” scenario, which makes the platform undervalued by 10% as of this writing. For long, I have made this business earn of me as an active user of the platform, now I will be looking to own a few shares if the price offers more than 10% of the value I have estimated in my story. Your story may be more “upbeat” or “downbeat”. The value that FB offers depends upon your story.

Thank you for reading!

Gautam

Disclaimer โ€“ Currently, I do not own any stock of this company. This analysis should not be misconstrued as a buy / sell recommendation. Readers are advised to do their own analysis. Moreover, any opinion expressed in this blog post is solely my own and does not represent views of my employer

Lyft IPO 2019 Valuation

Ride sharing companies have revolutionized the way we commute. While Uber has gone global and continues to expand to other businesses, Lyft has shown a much smaller narrative and is present only in US and Canada. Lyft just filed for a much awaited IPO and should get listed by the end of this month.

I had earlier valued lyft at around $5 bn in November last year. The data and assumptions were based on the limited statistics that were available on the internet. Although, I did expect annual revenue of ~$2 bn and loss of ~$900 mn and had baked these numbers in my valuation, but I was too far off in the number of active users / riders (my source of info led me take 32 mn and 23 mn users in 2018 and 2017 respectively). This statistic is key to valuing companies such as Lyft and Uber, which are making shared economy mainstream. Now since Lyft’s financials are public, we know the active number of users is 18.6 mn (as of Q4 2018 up from 12.6 mn in Q4 2017). I plugged the actual user based statistics in my model and the valuation that I get is $17 billion.

As earlier, the valuation framework that I have used has been pioneered by the renowned NYU Stern Prof. Aswath Damodaran. In his paper, Prof. Damodaran has explained how to incorporate user economics in a DCF Valuation. The fundamental equation to value such companies that Prof. Damodaran gives is simple and intuitive:

Value of a user based company = Value of existing users + Value added by new users โ€“ Value eroded by corporate expenses

Value of existing users (or customer lifetime value)

Each valuation needs to have a fact based story, which is essentially what we think of the company, its growth potential and the risk associated with its users/riders (i.e. would users stick or ditch).

Revenue per active user

Fact: Lyft reported a revenue of ~$130 per active user in 2018, up from ~$100 and ~$67 in 2017 and 2016 respectively. This translates to 30% revenue per user growth in 2018 and 50% growth in 2017. Moroever, Lyft’s share of revenue from gross billings is 26.7% ($2.15 bn revenue/$8.1 bn worth bookings).

Story: I believe Lyft’s wallet share would continue to grow, but the growth rate would continue to decrease from 50% (2017), 30% (2018) to 25% (2019) and 3% (Risk Free Rate in 2028).

Cost of Revenue & Operating Profit

Fact: After removing cost of revenue (which includes insurance, payment processing charges, technology costs and amortization), operating profit per active user is ~$55 in 2018, up from ~$38 and ~$13 in 2017 and 2016 respectively. This translates to a cost of revenue of 57.7% in 2018

Story: I believe the cost of revenue would be more or less the same in the near term, but would decrease in the long term as the company optimizes its operations

User Stickiness

Fact and Story: Considering that ride sharing businesses have disrupted the market with many users preferring it over their own cars (I certainly do!), I reckon that a major chunk of the existing ride sharing users would stick, although their loyalty to one company is uncertain. A subscription business model would have more user stickiness as opposed to a transaction based. With Lyft using loyalty programs and with its focused narrative on ride sharing, I go on to assume that 90% of riders would stick every year.

Using the assumptions, I go onto project after tax profit (i.e. by projecting revenue and cost) per user into the future. I take the present value of these future cash flows using a 10% cost of capital (75th percentile of global companies) and then adjust this present value for user stickiness. I get a customer lifetime value or value per existing user/rider of $450. With 18.6 million active riders, the total value for all existing customers is $8.4 billion

Value added by new users

Number of new users/riders added every year

Fact: Lyft reported a 18.6 mn active riders at the end of 2018, up from 12.6 mn and 6.6 mn in 2017 and 2016 respectively. This translates to 48% user growth in 2018 and 91% growth in 2017.

Story: With more and more people ditching their cars (and lease rentals) and opting for on demand ride sharing, I believe Lyft would be able to tap new users every year, but the growth rate would continue to decrease from 91% (2017), 48% (2018) to 25% (2019) and 3% (Risk Free Rate in 2028). The total users added each year is adjusted for user stickiness

User/rider acquisition cost

Of the entire amount Lyft spent (Revenue + Loss), it spent $1.24 bn of it in servicing existing users (reported as Cost of Revenue in the P&L) and ~$0.45 bn in general & admin expenses. The rest of the spend (~$1.14 bn), which includes sales, marketing and operations can be attributed to acquiring new customers (18.6 – 12.6 = 6 mn). The cost of acquiring a customer that I get is ~$190

Total value added by new users

Netting off user acquisition cost ($190) from the user lifetime value ($450), I get the value added by each new user to be ~$260.

I go on to project the value added by new acquired users/riders each year by multiplying the calculated new users each year with the value added by a new user each year compounded with the inflation rate. I then take the present value using a cost of capital to arrive at the total value added by new users to be $11.5 bn (Cost of capital is taken as 12%, which is higher than the cost of capital used for existing users. A cost of capital of 12% occurs at the 90th percentile for US companies )

Value eroded by corporate expenses (G&A)

Quoting from the S-1 prospectus – “General and administrative expenses primarily consist of certain insurance costs that are generally not required under TNC or city regulations, personnel-related compensation costs, professional services fees, certain loss contingency expenses including legal accruals and settlements, claims administrative fees and other corporate costs. Following the completion of this offering, it is expected to incur additional general and administrative expenses as a result of operating as a public company.” Corporate expenses are assumed to grow at 4% every year. Discounting the future cash outflows, I get the present value of corporate expenses of close to $5 bn

Putting it all together

Value of Lyft $14.9 bn = Value of existing users $8.4 bn + Value added by new users $11.5 bn โ€“ Value eroded by corporate expenses $5 bn

We also need to account for employee stock options ($609 mn), cash ($517.7 mn) and IPO proceeds ($2000 mn)

Removing employee stock options, and adding cash and IPO proceeds, I get the value of equity to be $16.8 billion

Since, the number of shares outstanding is 279 mn, I get a share price of $60.25 per share

Valuation is very sensitive to my assumptions on growth and user stickiness, which in turn depend upon Lyft’s ability to acquire and retain customers. The assumptions I have taken, although reasonable in my view, might be high or low. I do not claim any certitude to these numbers. As Prof. Damodaran says your story should drive numbers. Your story can very well be different from mine. Any higher values of these metrics would result in a higher valuation.

Please do let me know what you think in the comment section.

Lyft – User Based Valuation

Image Credits: grist.org, lyft

Edit (9th March 2019) – Using the user based statistics and financial information made public in Lyft’s S-1 prospectus, I have revalued Lyft at ~$17 billion. My valuation is presented in the link alongside https://investandrise.com/lyft-ipo-2019-valuation/

Ride sharing companies have revolutionized the way we commute. Both Uber and Lyft would be going public next year. While Uber has gone global and continues to expand to other businesses, Lyft has shown a much smaller narrative and is present only in US and Canada.

The most important parameter for companies born in the gig economy is the number of users/subscribers. VCs typically value (read price) such companies by “pricing” users/subscribers. The intrinsic value of an asset or business is the present value of its future cash flows (DCF – Discounted Cash Flow Valuation). So, an ideal way to value such companies would be to value users

In this blog post, I have attempted to value Lyft by valuing users using a framework taught by the renowned NYU Stern Prof. Aswath Damodaran. In his paper, Prof. Damodaran has explained how to incorporate user economics in a DCF Valuation or rather how would you use DCF to value user based companies born in the gig economy

The fundamental equation to value such companies that Prof. Damodaran gives is simple and intuitive:

Value of a user based company = Value of existing users + Value added by new users – Value eroded by corporate drag

Lyft’s being priced at $15.1 bn (as of this writing). Using a user based valuation,  I have valued Lyft at just under $5 bn by taking certain base case assumptions. The assumption values could be high or low. I do not claim any certitude to these numbers. To accommodate for different cases (or different values of assumption variables), I go on to use monte carlo to get a distribution of Lyft’s valuation across simulation trials. I find that ~80% of the distribution falls below Lyft’s current pricing of ~15 bn

In Lyft’s valuation below, I estimate values for Lyft’s existing users, new users and the value eroded by corporate drag

User Based Lyft’s Valuation

Since Lyft is yet to go public, so financials are hard to come by. I have used the 2018 Q1, Q2 & Q3 financials reported in the information to make estimates for Q4 and then used the base estimates for 2018 to forecast cashflows into the future

Exhibit 1: Estimates based on 2018 Q1, Q2 & Q3 as reported by The Information

a. Value of Existing Users

Simply put, the value of existing users is arrived at by estimating after tax operating profit per existing user for the base year and then forecasting it into the future, followed by taking the present value (PV) of the future cash flows. The PV per user is scaled by the number of existing users to arrive at the PV of after tax operating profit of all existing users. This PV is then slashed using the assumed probability of user lifetime

Base Year 2018 Estimates: (Data from Exhibit 1)

  • Base Year Operating Profit = 44.8% of Base Year Net Revenue per Existing User (this operating profit has been reported after deducting the cost of revenue only from the net revenue. Cost of revenue consists of insurance, credit card fees and technical infrastructure. It does not include sales & marketing, R&D and employee expenses)
  • Base Year Net Revenue per Existing User ($67.4 mn)= Estimated Net Revenue ($2129 mn) / Number of Users (Estimated *32 mn)

Assumption Variables for making Forecasts : 

  1. User Lifetime: For the base case, User Lifetime is assumed to be 15 years (This is an assumption. I do not have data backing user lifetime. I go on simulate this parameter to take on different values ranging from 4 to 20 years using a discrete triangular distribution)
  2. Probability of User Full Life: Annual Renewal Probability assumed at 95% ^ User Lifetime. Considering that ride sharing businesses have disrupted the market with many users preferring it over their own cars (I certainly do!), I reckon that a major chunk of the existing ride sharing users would stick, although their loyalty to one company is uncertain. A subscription business model would have more user stickiness as opposed to a transaction based. I have attempted to accommodate the uncertainty/variability in user stickiness, by inducing the probability of user full life take on different values in my simulation. (Since user lifetime is simulated to take on different values, hence probability of user full life becomes a variable as well. )
  3. Growth Rate (of Net Revenue): For the base case, Net Revenue per User is assumed to grow at 15% for the first 5 years, at 10% for the next 5 years and then at the risk free rate.  Again, these values could be high or low! I reckon that the company would mature after 10 years and hence, grow at the risk free rate. (To accommodate for the uncertainty on growth rate,  I simulate this parameter over a range of 8% to 20% using an asymmetric positively skewed continuous distribution)
  4. Growth Rate (of Cost of Servicing Existing Users): [x% * growth rate (of net revenue) ] + [(1-x%) * inflation rate], where x is assumed to be 80% for the base case (x is simulated to take on different values ranging from 70% to 100% using an asymmetric negatively skewed continuous distribution)
  5. Discounting Factors – Cost of Capital reflecting CashFlow uncertainty or User Risk: For the base case, cost of capital is taken as 10%, which is the 75th percentile for US companies. I just need to ensure that the cost of capital for existing users is lower than that of acquiring new users since the cash flows from new users would be more uncertain/risky. (Cost of capital is made to take on values ranging from 8% to 12% on a normal distribution. No skewness assumed since existing users would have relatively low risk vis-a-vis new users)
  6. Number of Users: As per Forbes, the number of users in 2017 were 23 mn. I couldn’t find the number of users in 2018, so I had to estimate it. Here is how –
  • Lyft achieved 1 billion rides in Sept 2018. It was at 500 mn rides around the same time frame last year. This translates into a compounded monthly growth of just under 6%
  • Extrapolating this growth till December of this base year 2018, I get an additional ~200 mn rides i.e. 1200 mn rides totally.
  • Taking out the number of rides till December 2017 (i.e 1200mn – (500+1.059^4)), I get ~600 mn rides in 2018
  • One of the other statistic that I found is that on an average each user took 19 rides. So, the *number of users in 2018 could be estimated as 600mn rides/19 rides per user ~ 32 mn users.  

*This is a crude method to estimate users and I would want to replace this estimate with the actual number of users as when that statistic becomes public*

Operating Profit (for each year in the future) = Net Revenue forecast  – Cost of Servicing Existing Users forecast

The future operating profit is discounted using cost of capital and then slashed using the probability of user full life

Exhibit 2: Value of Existing Lyft Users $6.1 bn (base case)

b. Value Added by New Users 

New users in the base year is the increase in users in base year 2018 over 2017. Base year value added by each new user is the amount by which value per existing user exceeds cost of adding a new user

Base Year 2018 Estimates:

  • Cost of Adding New Users is the amount spent over and above the spend on servicing Existing Users (and also excluding Corporate Expenses)
  • Amount spent over and above the spend on servicing Existing Users  = Operating Profit (on servicing existing users) + Net Loss Amount – Corporate Expenses
  • Therefore, Cost of Adding a New User = (Net Revenue + Net Loss – Cost of Servicing all Existing Users – Corporate Expenses) / (Users in 2018 – Users in 2017)
  • Base Year Value Added by New User = Value per Existing User – Cost of Adding a New User

Assumption Variables for making Forecasts :  

  1. Growth Rate (in # Users): Assumed 25% for the first 5 years and 10% for the next 5 years
  2. Annual Renewal Probability: Assumed at 95%.  I have attempted to accommodate the uncertainty/variability in user stickiness, by inducing the probability of user full life take on different values in my simulation.
  3. Discounting Factors – Cost of Capital reflecting CashFlow uncertainty or User Risk: For the base case, cost of capital is taken as 12%, which is higher than the cost of capital for existing users. A cost of capital of 12% occurs at the 90th percentile for US companies. (Cost of capital is made to take on values ranging from 9% to 18% using an asymmetric negatively skewed continuous distribution. I have assumed a negatively or left skewed distribution since existing new users would have relatively high risk vis-a-vis existing users)

New Users are estimated to increase at an assumed growth rate and decrease with the assumed annual renewal probability each year. Value per New User is forecast to increase each year with the inflation rate

Exhibit 3: Value added by New User $3.1 bn (base case)

c. Corporate Drag 

Corporate Drag of $400 mn in the base year is an assumed base case value. (It has been simulated to take different values ranging from $200 mn to $600 mn using a normal distribution)

Moreover, Corporate Drag is assumed to grow at 4% every year

Exhibit 4: Corporate Drag estimated at $4.4 bn (base case)

Exhibit 5: (base case) Value of Lyft $4.8 bn = Value of existing users $6.1 bn + Value added by new users $3.1 bn – Value eroded by corporate drag $4.4 bn

On running a monte carlo simulation, I get the following distribution for Lyft’s valuation (Exhibit 6)

Exhibit 6:  Distribution of Lyft’s valuation across simulation trials

Key statistics/observations from the distribution above:

  1. My base case valuation of $4.8 bn falls at the 44th percentile i. e. 44% of the distribution values are below $4.8 bn
  2. Median i.e. the 50th percentile occurs at a valuation of ~$6 bn
  3. Lyft’s “pricing” of $15.1 bn occurs near the 80th percentile, which means that ~80% of the values that I get are lower than this price
  4. Another interesting observation is that ~26% of values of the distribution are negative. This could be interpreted as Lyft’s probability of default

Valuation is very sensitive to the number of users. The above is just a snapshot in time valuation based on a lot of assumptions. Closer to its IPO in 2019, when Lyft makes its financials public, then I would replace the assumptions with actuals to arrive at its fair valuation