Business Valuation Education Video Series

Hello Readers,

In have started a Business Valuation Education Video Series in which, I will explain Valuation concepts by valuing an Indian Healthcare Provider – Kovai Medical Center Hospital – as an example. I will value companies in other sectors (e.g., insurance, banks, asset management companies, industrial, fmcg, retail etc.) after finishing healthcare.

This video series is meant for students / working professionals intending to build a career in / pivot to Finance particularly Valuation or Equity Research.

Link to the Business Valuation Education Video Series: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLqRd1Fd1U5KNK2IVjH6uOu_kC6YuR1Csb

Learning Objectives of this series:

If you are really serious about learning Valuation or Equity Research, please pick this company – Kovai Medical Center Hospital – and value this company along with me – this is the best way to learn! I’d be happy to share all the spreadsheets (without the projections). Start from the first video of this playlist.

I can be reached at gautamrastogi.investandrise@gmail.com or you can PM me on LinkedIn for any questions or any help that you may need.

If you find my content valuable, then please subscribe to my YT channel and follow / connect with me on LinkedIn

Invest and Rise!

Thanks,

Gautam

My notes on Rajshree Polypack, a company that makes packaging for F&B industry

As I have understood, there are two packaging types – rigid and flexible. In rigid packaging, there are broadly two methods to make packaging – Thermoforming and Injection Molding. In thermoforming, plastic rigid sheets are subjected to heat for molding into a desired shape. IM on the other hand, converts plastic pellets into molten material, which is then injected into a mold. Thermoformed packaging is thinner than injection molded and as such both methods have different applications.

Rajshree Polypack (RPPL) is a microcap company that was started as a partnership firm in 2003 and then incorporated as a pvt ltd in 2011. The company makes plastic rigid sheets and thermoformed packaging for food and beverage industry. Plastic rigid sheets are both sold directly to end-customers and are used in captive production of packaging goods. The company has been steadily increasing capacity of both extrusion (for making rigid sheets) and thermoforming.

In FY23, they got into making IM packaging through a toll manufacturing agreement (i.e., Rajshree supplies the raw materials and pays a fee to access the contractorโ€™s manufacturing capabilities). As of now, the mfg capacity is 1,000 MT.

They have entered into a JV – Olive Pack – to make coated paper cups, glasses etc. The capacity will be 12,000 MT. This will get operational in FY25.

Moat

RPPL has a good list of marque F&B customers that have a stringent quality, timely delivery and turn-around-time criteria for packaging. It is not easy to become an approved supplier to such customers. In a very competitive and fragmented industry, this is perhaps RPPL’s biggest and only moat.

What is stopping me from developing 100% conviction just yet?

RPPL is trading at a market cap of INR 230 Cr (as of 20/12/24). 10 years ago in FY14, Mold-Tek Packaging – which makes Injection Molded packaging for paint, lube and F&B companies – had very similar sales (250 cr) and margin (12-13% EBITDA) as RPPL has today. But, Mold-Tek sweated their assets better and made Rs 3 for every Rs. of assets, whereas RPPL, which has a asset turnover of 2 currently. However, Mold-Tek had a higher D/E of 1.3-1.4 vs RPPL 0.7 currently.

During FY14, Mold-Tek saw its market cap become 5-6x from 50 cr to 250-300 Cr, which is at a shouting distance from what RPPL is trading at today. Mold-Tek then went onto post great results year after year. Although, initially they used a lot of debt to drive growth, but very quickly they pared it down to comfortable levels and used internal accruals to increases sales 3x (from FY14; 4x from FY13) to 730 Cr, expanded cumulative EBITDA margin to 17.5% with a weighted avg asset turnover of 2.3. The company now has a market cap of ~3,000 Cr i.e., 10x after its peak valuation of 300 cr in FY14.

The question is can RPPL replicate Mold-Tek’s growth? I do understand that comparison with Mold-Tek may be unfair since it draws 70% of its sales from paint, lube and oil customers; I am attempting to dig out what worked for Mold-Tek and how is RPPL placed currently.

So, now coming to why I don’t have full conviction just as yet?

  1. RPPL supplies to F&B industry only. Thermoformed packaging is thinner vs IM and hence is used in holding lighter content i.e., packaged food. IM packages, on the other hand, find application in a wide variety of industries – paints, lubricants, oils besides F&B. (Back in FY14, Mold-Tek drew 90%+ sales from paint and lube industry and how the split between paints, lubes: food, fmcg is 70:30. Being able to supply do multiple industries seem to have worked well for Mold-Tek). Moreover, thermoformed packaging cannot cater to heavier food content such as ice creams, shrikhand, spreads, dosa batter etc. Not saying thermoforming is inferior. It certainly is not. It finds its end use in different applications, which has limited RPPL to one industry. Make no mistake, F&B industry has great growth potential, but I would have been more confident about RPPL’s prospects if they didn’t stay confined to just F&B.
  2. No in-house Injection Molding yet. RPPL recently forayed into IM through a toll mfg agreement for food delivery containers. Since RPPL does not own the IM mfg tech, they likely wouldn’t be able to tech innovate (as Mold-Tek has been able to) and sign up existing and new marque customers for IM containers. Mold-Tek designs, maintains and manufactures their own molds (they also use robots for in-mold printing and decorating), which has given them an edge over competitors and has also helped them get exclusivity contracts with certain lube customers. Large customers are very picky when it comes to packaging since it is the face of their brand and hence they may not source from a company that does not own the mfg process. This may change in the future if and when RPPL begins investing in its own IM capability (and this may also help them foray into other industries).
  3. Capital allocation decisions! Value proposition in developing paper packaging? Will it lead to a moated business model? I am not so convinced. Although, this will likely give them good sales uptick serving HoReCa, but then how does it help in building a sustainable competitive advantage? Paper packaging is a non-differentiated / commodity item (but then one might argue that plastic rigid sheets are as well). What stops HoReCa customers from switching to (and keeping) other vendors? I believe the differentiation may not entirely be in the product per se (but because they have a good clientele, they may be to upsell them this new product category). Moreover, this new mfg capability demands an investment of 100 Cr, of which RPPL is putting half. To put it in context, this 50 cr is 1/3rd of RPPL’s gross fixed assets. Allocating an amount equivalent to 1/3rd of your gross fixed assets in a capability with low competitive advantages may not have been the best thing to do in my opinion. I hope I am proved wrong!
  4. Possibility of margin expansion? Over the last 5 years RPPL has witnessed its margin deteriorate (although, they have been able to more-or-less pass on RM price increases with a lag). This has been due to low operating leverage, high depreciation and interest cost. As op leverage plays out, they should see their margin expand. Mold-Tek expanded their cumulative EBITDA margin by 5% over the last 10 years because of widening gross margins, operating leverage and low levels of debt. Moreover, in-house IM mfg and automation has aided Mold-Tek keep in its margin expansion. Now, RPPL has in-house thermoforming, but since they don’t own the IM mfg, this may constrain RPPL’s ability to expand its margins to the extent Mold-Tek has been able to.
  5. Promoter giving aggressive guidance?. There have been instances (although I am leaning towards not reading much into them for now) where the promoter has not entirely walked the talk e.g., promoter was confident on margin expansion in FY23, but that didn’t happen. They were also expecting the olive pack mfg plant to commence from Oct, Nov 2023, but that didn’t happen. Re: barrier packaging sale, promoter gave a guidance of 30 cr+ in FY24, however only 10 cr in H1 has happened. I like conservative promoters better.
  6. Tube lamination business commenced, but was put on halt. The management seemed very ecstatic about this business at one point, but now they are saying it has been paused and will be looked into at a later point.
  7. Statutory audit fees increased from 8 L in FY21 to 16 L in FY22 to 22 L in FY23. Sales and scale of operations also did increase from 16K MT to 26K MT in this period. Scale can be equated to more work for auditors. So this is fine for now. However, if the disproportionate increase in audit fees continues then it will be a red flag.
  8. Strategic foreign investor gradually reducing their holding. Wifag Polytype Holding AG has been decreasing shareholding; 19.8% FY22 to 17.2% FY23 to 16.4% now. Moreover, Mr. Alain Edmond Berset (DIN: 07181896) resigned from the post as the nominee director of the Company (on behalf of Wifag Polytype Holding AG) w.e.f March 10, 2023.
  9. Aging receivables. 8% of the receivables were aged in FY23 i.e., beyond 1 year. This number was 4% in FY21 and 2% in FY22. RPPL has credit terms of 60 days. Since RPPL adds a good number of customers every year. I am assuming not all of these are very known brands. Many of these may be small mom-n-pop F&B businesses. If these small businesses don’t do well, they may shut shop and just not honor their payments to RPPL.
  10. Regulatory overhang. RPPL has stated that its products are of a much higher thickness than the ones which the government has sought to ban. Even if the regulations become aggressive, the end-companies wouldn’t stop selling their products. They will resort to alternatives such as bio-degradable packaging or thicker plastic. RPPL has also repeatedly stated that it has the capability to manufacture bio-degradable / sustainable products and they have the required certifications.

Despite having raised the above, one can’t overlook the fact that RPPL has a great set of F&B clients that can be sold more products in the future (but that will take some doing). Even with supplying the existing set of products to these existing clients, RPPL should continue growing. However, I’d like them cover a broader part of the value chain; they are doing it currently, but perhaps not in the way it has been done (by Mold-Tek).

Closing Thoughts and Valuation

It is interesting to note that as per my DCF (after projecting the three financial statements), for RPPL to almost justify its current valuation of Rs. 230 Cr, the company needs to demonstrate very similar growth, margin expansion and capital efficiency as Mold-Tek did over the last 10 years.

I am tempted to say that the market is pricing in the same high growth as Mold-Tek for RPPL, but that may not be entirely true. Right now, Indian micro and small cap scape seems to be in euphoria. People are playing the momentum game (I don’t know how to time the markets; I have a very long term investing horizon) so the market pricing currently does not seem rational. When the frenzy fades away and normalcy returns, and RPPL is available at sane valuations, then I may take a small stake subject to how some of the above points unfold in the future.

P.S: This is not a recommendation.

For any questions or comments, feel free to email me at gautamrastogi.investandrise@gmail.com or PM me on linkedin.

My notes on Macpower, a company that makes CNC Machines

Image Credit: https://www.thecrucible.org/guides/machining/lathes/

I came across CNC machines through a post in LinkedIn. Up until that time, I had never heard of CNC. CNC stands for Computer Numerical Control. CNC machines are software driven machine tools used in manufacturing plants for metal cutting. My wife, who has an automotive engineering background, explained to me the application of these tools in automobile plants (these tools find application in almost every industry and not just automobiles). She explained to me – I am over simplifying – that at one end these tools are as simple as just having one axis for making one cut or a hole at one time, and at the other end these tools are as complex as having multiple axis for making multiple cuts or holes at one time. Simple tools are also used for making multiple cuts, but they need manual intervention since after each cut, the metal needs to be fed to the CNC machine again (at a different angle perhaps) to make another cut / hole.

Market Size

As per Indian Machine Tool Manufacturers Association (IMTMA) Annual Report 2023, this is a INR 24,000 Cr market in India. More than 50% of the machine tools – by value – are imported. 75% of the market in India is of metal cutting. 25% of the market is in metal pressing, grinding, sheet metal technology like laser cutting and press pack etc. A bulk of this 25% market and some of the metal cutting market is imported.

In India, if manufacturing share in GDP is to increase to 21-22% (as per Morgan Stanley) from current 17% over a decade, then the machine tools market could cross INR 70,000 Cr from 24,000 Cr in 2023. Assuming Make in India impetus drives import substitution down to 40%, the market for Indian players could cross 40,000 Cr (over the next decade) from 12,000 Cr today – this is 3.5x growth in 10 years.

Company Profile

Established in 2003, Macpower CNC Machines Limited is engaged in the manufacture of Computerized Numerically Controlled (CNC) machines. It has a CNC Machine manufacturing unit in an area of around 8 acres at Metoda G.I.D.C., Rajkot, Gujarat (India).
The company listed (IPO) in 2018. Proceeds of the issue were used to help the company backward integrate into the manufacture of Machining components and enhance production capacity. They supply their products to automobile, defense, general engineering and other industries.

Competition

6 prominent players in India – Lakshmi Machine Works (listed), Bharat Fritz Werner, Ace Designers, Lokesh Machines (listed), Jyoti CNC and Macpower CNC. These are present in the 75% metal cutting market.

Market Share

Macpower (~INR 200 Cr sales in FY23) has a market share of 1.6% by value. Lakshmi Machine Works (~INR 1,000 Cr sales in machine tools in FY23) and Ace Designer have the largest share. Until recently, Macpower drew its market share primarily from simple or low-end machines (with an average selling price of INR 20L per machine), they are now striving to establish a stronger foothold in high-end or high value machines (Larger players have an average selling price per machine of ~INR 30L). To achieve this, they have increased their service and sales force across the country.

Things I like about Macpower

  • Conservative Management: Promoters follow a model of gradual growth and remaining debt free, with a focus on the margin. Macpower has an operating cost (or in-direct cost) of 20% vs peers 25%. Among the peers, Lakshmi Motor Works is also debt free, but has higher operating costs of 25%.
  • Receivable Management: Macpower has a sharp focus on receivables. Their average receivable is 20 days. All peers have higher receivables. The company takes advances against the orders they receive and dispatches the goods only after they receive full payments – specifically for non-government i.e., private orders.
  • Focus on selling high value products: Macpower has set up service and sales force across the length and breath of the country – inline with large players – to help increase their sale of high value products.
  • Industry Tailwind: There is a lot of focus on manufacturing in India and offering companies an alternative to China. Manufacturing companies need machines and machine tools are central to machines. Right now, the number of CNC machines that India makes in a year is equivalent to the number that China consumes in a month.

What needs improvement?

Backward Integration: COGS (or direct cost) at Macpower is higher at 70% vs peers at ~65%. Macpower is focusing on backward integration to drive their COGS down. As per promoters, in this industry, one can’t make more than 60-65% of raw materials or backward components in-house. Macpower makes 35% in-house and imports the remaining.

Because there is scope for backward integration, an investor would notice that the company typically keeps a lot of raw material and semi-finished goods inventory. They have ~190 days or ~6 months of overall inventory outstanding. Large player Lakshmi Motor Works on the other hand has faster inventory turns.

Macpower is deploying CapEx to make backward components like Turrets and others to reduce imports and consequently reduce COGS. Moreover, foundry is a large part of COGS, which Macpower currently does not do. Many of their peers have their own foundry, as a result of which their COGS is lower. Macpower promoters have indicated that setting up their own foundry and casting will help drive their costs lower (however, they have not indicated when).

Points of Caution

  • Related Party Transactions: Although, promoters in the past have waived their right to receive dividends signaling a minority shareholder friendly management, but they do make purchases from related parties. Purchases from related parties were worth 24L in FY23, 49L in FY22, 16L in FY21, 6L in FY20. It would be good to see these purchase going down overtime. Moreover, there was a delay in filing related party transactions in FY23 resulting in a fine.
  • Miscellaneous Expenses: They reported high miscellaneous expenses of 3.2 Cr in FY23 and 2.4 Cr in FY22. Shareholders will benefit if the company itemizes or explains these expenses. These expenses are under 1.5% of sales, but substantial relative to PAT

Investing (rather I should say long-term investing; and certainly not trading) in small cap companies is all about betting on their promoters. Once you have established that the promoters are not treating the company as their ATM, then placing your bet mostly hinges on the promoter’s vision and their ability to execute that vision. Of course, you want to buy stake at the right price and you want the company to be in a growing market!.

Valuation

Since the time I started looking into this company, the market cap increased from under INR 500 Cr to ~INR 600 Cr. , which is 40x earnings. As per my DCF valuation – after projecting the 3 financial statements – I find the fair market value of this company to be around INR 450 Cr, which is 30x earnings. Lakhsmi Machine Works is trading at ~34x earnings.

Valuations are subjective. I have taken the following assumptions to project out cash flows and value Macpower:

  • Growth: Driven by gradual capacity expansions and 75-90% capacity utilization (inline with history), Macpower doubles it market share to 3.3% over the next 10 years resulting in sales increasing 7x to INR 1,400 Cr.
  • Capacity Expansion: From 1,500 machines to 2,000 machines by FY25 (per management commentary) and 6,000 machines (assumption) by FY33. I have factored in the cost of land requirement (45,000 sq foot of land requirement per 500 machines – as per management) to expand beyond 2,000 machines.
  • Margin: Gross margin increases to 31% from 29.8% today due to backward integration. I will give them a higher gross margin if and when they get their own foundry. Economies of scale benefit resulting in indirect expenses reducing from 19.6% to 16% over 10 years.
  • Cost of Equity: Discount rate of 14% as my bare min return expectation.

Summary

The above assumptions needs to be true to justify a price of INR 450 Cr (i.e., 30x earnings) today. As per my FY28 projection, the company will do Sales and PAT of INR 550 Cr and ~70 Cr respectively. Assuming the company trades at 30x 5 years out, then the then market cap could increase to ~INR 2100 Cr (from 600 Cr as of 24/11), which is 3.5x growth in 5 years i.e., 28% CAGR.

I am keen to participate in the machine tool growth story, however I am being resistant to FOMO and will not take a position in Macpower until the company is available at a significant discount.

PS: This is not a recommendation.

๐—›๐—ผ๐˜„ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฎ๐—น๐˜†๐˜‡๐—ฒ ๐—ป๐—ผ๐—ป-๐—น๐—ถ๐—ณ๐—ฒ / ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ถ๐—ป๐˜€๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜€?

I read a few Berkshire and Marcellus newsletters to deepen my understanding of non-life insurance. Below are the key factors that one should analyze. I have applied them to two listed private non-life Indian insurers: ICICI Lombard and Star Health

๐Ÿญ. ๐—™๐—น๐—ผ๐—ฎ๐˜ = investment assets accumulated over time
Insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. This leaves them holding money, which Buffet call “float”. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float (in turn called โ€œinvestment assetsโ€ on the BS) to generate interest income
IL: 40,000 Cr float; 21,000 Cr gross premium i.e. float accumulated is 2x premium
SH: 12,000 Cr float, 12,000 Cr gross premium i.e. float 1x premium
Moreover, over the last 5 years SH has partly relied on external capital to grow float

๐Ÿฎ. ๐—–๐—ผ๐˜€๐˜ ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐—ณ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ฎ๐˜ = underwriting loss/float
If premiums exceed expenses and eventual claim payments, insurers register an underwriting profit i.e. they get paid to acquire float. Underwriting loss on the other hand is the cost of float. Quoting Buffet โ€œan insurance business has value if its cost of float overtime is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for moneyโ€
Pre-COVID 5 year avg IL: 2%, SH -2%
i.e. SH was paid 2% to acquire float. Since SH is almost exclusively into retail health, which has higher premiums leading to lower claims ratio (but higher expense than IL) resulting in overall higher UW profitability pre-COVID

๐Ÿฏ. ๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐˜๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ป ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—ณ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ฎ๐˜ = investment yield – cost of float
The underlying profit/loss adds to the investment income produced from the float
Pre-COVID 5 year avg IL: 8.5%-2%=6.5%, SH: 7%-(-2%)=9%
Negative cost of float has yielded better return on float for SH

๐Ÿฐ. ๐—œ๐—ป๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—Ÿ๐—ฒ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ด๐—ฒ = investment assets/book equity
The investment assets or float generated per unit of equity is called leverage. Pre-COVID avg IL: 3.5x, SH: 2.2x. IL has been able to drive a higher leverage. Why?

๐Ÿฑ. ๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐˜๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ป ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—˜๐—พ๐˜‚๐—ถ๐˜๐˜† = posttax return on float * leverage
Insurers with high ROE (>> COE) over extended periods of time generate a lot of shareholder value
Pre-COVID avg IL: 17%(=6.5%*3.5* 1-tax%), SH: 15%
Remember, expenses are upfront, claim payments come over a period. Since, IL has higher claims ratio, but lower expense ratio, it has done better in retaining float for longer resulting in higher leverage and in turn slightly better ROE

IL and SH are currently trading over 6, 7x BV resp. For valuing a non-life insurance firm, one needs to project the long-term outlook of all these factors. I have valued both of them. Valuation summary in another post.

What are your thoughts on non-life insurance businesses and their valuations?ย 
#investandrise #nonlifeinsurance #generalinsurance #SAHI #insurancevaluation #equityresearch